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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE*
Amici are Members of Congress committed to enforcing Congress’ long-standing judgment that sexual
violence has no place in the military and that no statute of limitations bars its prosecution. To this end,
amici have all been involved in legislative efforts in
this area and seek to defend Congress’ decades-old
policy of requiring punishment for rape in the military
no matter how long ago the offense occurred.
Amici are:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Rep. Brian Mast (R-FL)
Rep. James R. Baird (R-IN)
Rep. Gus Bilirakis (R-FL)
Rep. Gilbert R. Cisneros Jr. (D-CA)
Rep. Charlie Crist (D-FL)
Rep. Ted Deutch (D-FL)
Rep. Vicky Hartzler (R-MO)
Rep. Denny Heck (D-WA)
Rep. Kendra S. Horn (D-OK)
Rep. Ann McLane Kuster (D-NH)
Rep. Jackie Speier (D-CA)
Rep. Haley Stevens (D-MI)
Rep. Ted Yoho (D-FL)

*

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amici represent that
this brief was not authored in whole or in part by any party or
counsel for any party. No person or party other than amici or
their counsel made a monetary contribution to the preparation
or submission of this brief. Respondents have granted blanket
consent to the filing of amicus curiae briefs and amici have received the written consent of the Government in accord with Supreme Court Rule 37.3.
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STATEMENT
1. In 2005, Air Force officer Michael Briggs went
to the room of a member of his squadron and forced
her to have sex with him—ignoring her exclamations
of “no” and “stop” and her attempts to roll away from
him. The rape was so violent that she bled for days;
she was so bruised and swollen that she was unable
to sit down. In 2000, Air Force course instructor Richard Collins pushed a student in his course against the
wall, threw her to the floor, and struck her on the face
before brutally raping her. And in 1998, Air Force airman Humphrey Daniels raped a civilian in the community near his air base—in the same bed where her
child was sleeping.
2. Rape is always an evil and devastating
crime—but the harm is compounded when it occurs in
the highly regimented environment of the military,
which stresses the imperative of respecting and deferring to authority. In a setting designed to inculcate
swift and unquestioning obedience, rape is a uniquely
harmful betrayal of trust.
For too long, these dynamics have frequently deterred survivors from reporting rape in the military.
Because many survivors fear that their careers will be
damaged if they report a rape committed by a superior, egregious criminal conduct all too often goes unpunished—depriving survivors of justice and poisoning the cohesion and effectiveness of the military.
Both Congress and the military have long been
aware of these tragic realities. When the rapes in this
case were committed, Articles 43(a) and 120(a) of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) treated
rape as an “offense punishable by death” to which no
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statute of limitations applied. The Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces adopted that view twice over,
reasoning in Willenbring v. Neurauter, 48 M.J. 152
(C.A.A.F. 1998), and United States v. Stebbins, 61
M.J. 366 (C.A.A.F. 2005), that the UCMJ recognized
no temporal limitation on prosecutions for rape. In
2006, Congress amended the UCMJ to further clarify
that no statute of limitations applies to rape in the
military. See National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2006 (2006 NDAA) § 553(a), Pub. L. No.
109-163, 119 Stat. 3136, 3264.
3. Following that amendment, the three survivors in these cases came forward—and justice was
served. In 2014, 2016, and 2017, courts-martial found
Briggs, Collins, and Daniels guilty of rape, dismissed
them from the Air Force, and sentenced them to confinement.
But in 2018, the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces broke from long-standing consensus and imported civilian death-penalty jurisprudence into the
context of military discipline. Because this Court has
held that it violates the Eighth Amendment to impose
the death penalty for rape in the civilian context, the
court of appeals reasoned that rape no longer constitutes an “offense punishable by death” under the
UCMJ, and so—in contravention of the statute’s clear
text and Congress’ important purposes—the court of
appeals grafted a five-year statute of limitations onto
the crime of rape in the military.
4. That decision reflects a profound misunderstanding of the governing legal framework that will
have grave consequences if permitted to stand.
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First, the decision ignores the relevant text, structure, and legislative history to reach a conclusion
wholly alien to the meaning of the UCMJ. Although
this Court has the authority to decide which punishments may be constitutionally imposed for particular
offenses, the power to determine which punishments
are warranted belongs to Congress—particularly in
the context of the military, which the Constitution explicitly tasks Congress with regulating. The court of
appeals erred by rewriting statutory text and obliterating these congressional judgments.
Second, the decision overrides a congressional determination—that no statute of limitations bars the
prosecution of rape in the military—which rests on
critical policy judgments about the harms caused by
rape in the military. In addition to the profound
harms suffered by individual victims, rape has a devastating effect on unit cohesion and morale, and the
military’s hierarchical structure tends to deter survivors from coming forward. Recognizing these devastating harms, Congress adopted a policy of treating
rape in the military as an “offense punishable by
death”—and nothing permits, much less requires,
that policy judgment to be set aside.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Constitution entrusts Congress with authority over military discipline, including the authority to
determine what (if any) statutes of limitations apply
to crimes that occur within the military. By classifying rape as an “offense punishable by death” and stipulating that “offenses punishable by death” are not
subject to statutes of limitations, Congress entrenched the policy that rape within the military is not
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subject to any statute of limitations at all. Whether
the death penalty can be constitutionally imposed for
the rape of an adult—an open question in the specialized military context—is wholly irrelevant to the key
question here: Whether Congress determined that
the death penalty is warranted for rape in the military. In answering “no,” the court below flouted the
text, structure, and history of the statute; departed
from long-standing precedent (including its own); and
overrode Congress’ policy judgment on a matter of
grave importance to both service members as individuals and the military as a whole.
Congress’ policy judgment—that rape within the
military is so heinous and so damaging to military effectiveness that no temporal restriction should be
placed on its prosecution—is entitled to respect. Rape
in the military has devastating effects on survivors individually and military readiness generally. And the
military’s hierarchical command structure can exacerbate the understandable reluctance of rape survivors to come forward and report the crimes committed
against them. In light of those considerations, the
provisions in the Uniform Code of Military Justice
that address rape in the military have been understood for decades to reflect Congress’ intent that those
who commit the crime of rape should not be permitted
to escape justice by hiding behind the passage of time.
This Court should interpret the Uniform Code of Military Justice to reflect that intent and fulfill Congress’
exceedingly important purposes in declining to subject
the prosecution of rape in the military to temporal
limitation.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE
DECISION
BELOW
UNDERMINES
CONGRESS’ AUTHORITY OVER MILITARY
DISCIPLINE BY REWRITING THE UNIFORM
CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE.

The Constitution vests authority over the framework of military discipline exclusively in Congress.
Article I expressly assigns to Congress the power “[t]o
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval Forces.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
Accordingly, it has long been recognized that “the Legislative Branch has plenary control over * * * the
framework of the military establishment, including
regulations, procedures and remedies related to military discipline.” Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301
(1983).1 And this Court has deferred to congressional
regulation of the military in myriad contexts. See
Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 447–48 (1987)
(collecting cases and detailing judicial deference to
Congress’ regulation of the military in the areas of
free exercise, racial discrimination, sex discrimination,
free expression, right to counsel, and due process).

1

See also Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1957) (“Military
law * * * exists separate and apart from the law which governs
in our federal judicial establishment. * * * The Framers expressly entrusted that task to Congress.”); Dynes v. Hoover, 61
U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1857) (“Congress has the power to provide
for the trial and punishment of military and naval offences.”);
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 777–78 (1996) (Thomas,
J., concurring in the judgment) (“In light of Congress’ express
constitutional authority to regulate the Armed Forces, and the
unique nature of the military’s mission, we have afforded an unparalleled degree of deference to congressional action governing
the military.”) (internal citation omitted).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3519376

7
Congress’ power to regulate military discipline
goes hand in hand with its power to establish statutes
of limitations that govern the prosecution of improper
conduct. Statutes of limitations “reflect[ ] a policy
judgment by the legislature” regarding when (if at all)
“the lapse of time” renders “criminal acts ill suited for
prosecution.” Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. 106,
112 (2013).
The decision below seriously undermines Congress’ plenary authority over military discipline by erroneously imposing a five-year limitations period on
prosecuting rapes in the military perpetrated before
2006. As text, structure, and history all make abundantly clear, that most certainly was not Congress’ intent. Cf. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 125
(1979) (statutes of limitations should be given “effect
in accordance with what [the Court] can ascertain the
legislative intent to have been”).
Congress considers rape in the military to be
among the most heinous offenses that can be committed, and its express constitutional authority to regulate military discipline is seriously eroded when
courts fail to apply its enactments by their plain and
unmistakable terms.
A. Statutory Text And Structure Unmistakably Reflect Congress’ Determination That No Statute Of Limitations
Should Apply To Rape In The Military.
At the time respondents raped their victims, the
text of the UCMJ unambiguously reflected Congress’
determination that rape in the military is not subject
to a statute of limitations. Article 120 provided that
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rape “shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.” 10 U.S.C.
§ 920(a) (1994 & 2000).2 And Article 43 stated that
“any offense punishable by death[ ] may be tried and
punished at any time without limitation.” 10 U.S.C.
§ 843(a) (1994 & 2000) (emphasis added).3
Those two clauses plainly expressed Congress’
policy determination that rape is so repugnant—and
so destructive to military readiness—that perpetrators cannot be shielded by any statute of limitations.
For over two decades, the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces read those two interdependent clauses
to mean exactly what they said. See Willenbring, 48
M.J. at 178–80 (“rape is an ‘offense punishable by
2

Rape in the military has been punishable by death for “more
than a century.” Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 945, 946 (2008)
(statement of Kennedy, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer, JJ., respecting the denial of rehearing) (citing Enrollment Act § 30, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 731, 736 (1863)); see also Gov’t Br.
34. When Congress first enacted the UCMJ in 1950, it made rape
in the military committed during peacetime punishable by death
as well. See Act of May 5, 1950 (1950 UCMJ) art. 120(a), ch. 169,
Pub. L. No. 81-506, 64 Stat. 107, 140 (1950) (“Any person subject
to this code who commits an act of sexual intercourse * * * by force
and without [ ] consent, is guilty of rape and shall be punished by
death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.”).
3

Congress eliminated the statute of limitations for all offenses
“punishable by death” in 1986. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 (1987 NDAA) § 805(a), Pub. L. No.
99-661, 100 Stat. 3816, 3908 (1986) (“A person charged with absence without leave or missing movement in time of war, or with
any offense punishable by death, may be tried and punished at
any time without limitation.”) (emphasis added); compare 1950
UCMJ art. 43(a), 64 Stat. at 121 (“A person charged with desertion or absence without leave in time of war, or with aiding the
enemy, mutiny, or murder, may be tried and punished at any
time without limitation.”).
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death’ for purposes of exempting it from the 5–year
statute of limitations of Article 43”); Stebbins, 61 M.J.
at 369 (reaffirming Willenbring).
Then, in 2018, the court of appeals reversed
course and held—contrary to the statutes’ plain text
and Congress’ clear intent—that the crime of rape in
the military is subject to a five-year statute of limitations. United States v. Mangahas, 77 M.J. 220, 222–25
(C.A.A.F. 2018) (overruling Willenbring and Stebbins
and holding that “rape is not exempt from the five-year
statute of limitations”). The court reached that new
conclusion by importing this Court’s civilian deathpenalty jurisprudence into the military context. The
court reasoned that—because executing a civilian rapist would violate the Eighth Amendment under this
Court’s precedents—rape in the military could not
technically be “punishable by death,” which meant
that a limitations period must apply. Ibid. (citing
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977)).4
The court of appeals’ decision is profoundly
flawed. For one thing, its approach to statutory interpretation makes little sense. The court of appeals
held, in essence, that the meaning of the statutory
phrase “punishable by death” turned not on the punishment Congress explicitly authorized in the UCMJ,
but instead on whether the court of appeals thought
this Court would deem that punishment constitutionally permissible. Id. at 223 (rape not “punishable by
death” because although “the UCMJ authorized the
4

Amici agree with the Government that the court of appeals
erred by importing civilian death-penalty jurisprudence into the
military-discipline context. See Gov’t Br. 22–23, 31–39; see also
Briggs Pet. 16–20; Collins Pet. 14.
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death sentence[ ] for rape, * * * such punishment cannot be constitutionally inflicted”). In so doing, the
court endorsed an approach to interpretation that
would make it virtually impossible for courts to ascertain the meaning of any statute with certainty, as it
would require overlaying predicted constitutional outcomes on top of the text that Congress actually
adopted.
For another thing, Congress’ meaning was perfectly clear. The interlocking provisions of Articles 43
and 120 make plain that—for limitations purposes—
Congress intended the phrase “punishable by death”
to be defined statutorily, not judicially. At the time
respondents raped their victims, Article 43 provided
that there was no limitation on prosecuting offenses
that Congress deemed so detrimental to military readiness that they were “punishable by death.” 10 U.S.C.
§ 843(a) (1994 & 2000). By providing that rape could
“be punished by death,” Article 120 conveyed Congress’ determination that rape was precisely that type
of offense. 10 U.S.C. § 920(a) (1994 & 2000).5
Neither the Mangahas decision, nor any of the respondents in this case, offers a coherent reason why
Congress would have intended the application of the
UCMJ’s statute of limitations to turn on past and future judicial determinations about whether an offense’s maximum punishment would be constitutionally permissible. More logically, application of the
5

Further highlighting the differences between the civilian and
military contexts is the fact that Article 43 also provided that no
statute of limitation applied to offenses that have no parallel in
the civilian context, like being absent without leave and missing
movement in a time of war. 10 U.S.C. § 843(a) (1994 & 2000).
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UCMJ’s statute of limitations turns on the punishment authorized by the UCMJ itself. After all, it is an
elementary principle of statutory interpretation that
the UCMJ, “like every Act of Congress, should not be
read as a series of unrelated and isolated provisions,”
but rather as a whole. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513
U.S. 561, 570 (1995).
Other courts have recognized this principle and
acknowledged that whether an offense is “punishable
by death” (or qualifies as a “capital” offense) for limitations purposes turns on the statutorily authorized
punishments for the offense, not on whether a death
sentence would be constitutionally permissible. See
18 U.S.C. §§ 3281, 3282. In United States v. Manning,
for example, the Ninth Circuit reasoned:
If the statute’s purpose derives from the nature of the offense with which the defendant
is charged and not from the potential severity
of the punishment, it remains in effect. After
all, in a very literal sense, the offense defined
[in the criminal statute] is still a “capital
crime;” the statute still authorizes the imposition of the death penalty and Congress has not
repealed it.
56 F.3d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal citations,
quotation marks, and brackets omitted); see also
United States v. Gallaher, 624 F.3d 934, 940–41 (9th
Cir. 2010) (“ ‘punishable by death’ is a calibration of
the seriousness of the crime as viewed by Congress,
not of the punishment that could actually be imposed
on the defendant in an individual case”); United States
v. Payne, 591 F.3d 46, 58–59 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[I]n determining whether an offense is ‘punishable by death’
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* * * we look to the character of the offense and the
penalties that are set out by statute. An offense ‘punishable by death,’ within the meaning of § 3281, is one
for which the statute authorizes death as a punishment, regardless of whether the death penalty is
sought by the prosecution or ultimately found appropriate by the factfinder or the court.”); United States
v. Ealy, 363 F.3d 292, 296 (4th Cir. 2004) (“whether a
crime is ‘punishable by death’ under § 3281 or ‘capital’
under § 3282 depends on whether the death penalty
may be imposed for the crime under the enabling statute, not ‘on whether the death penalty is in fact available for defendants in a particular case’ ”).6
In sum, the operative text and structure of the
UCMJ plainly reflect Congress’ intent that the prosecution of rape in the military is not to be subject to any
temporal limitation.
B. Legislative History Confirms What Statutory Text Makes Plain: Congress Intended No Limitation On The Prosecution Of Rape In The Military.
In 1986, Congress amended Article 43 to eliminate the statute of limitations for “any offense punishable by death.” 1987 NDAA § 805(a), 100 Stat. at
3908. Before that amendment, the UCMJ already recognized that no limitation applied to the prosecution
of murder. See 10 U.S.C. § 843(a) (1982) (“aiding the
6

Daniels’s attempt to distinguish these cases on the ground
that they involve murder rather than rape is misguided. See
Daniels BIO 12–14. In each case, the defendant was not eligible
for the death penalty. Nevertheless, each case held that the statute of limitations turned on the statutorily authorized punishment—not on whether death would have been a constitutionally
permissible punishment.
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enemy, mutiny, or murder, may be tried and punished
at any time without limitation”). Congress removed the
limitations period from all offenses that were “punishable by death” to increase the likelihood that perpetrators who committed crimes most detrimental to military readiness would face prosecution and punishment.
Moreover, Congress identified such offenses statutorily—regardless of whether this Court might deem
the authorized punishments constitutionally permissible at some future date. By explaining that “no statute of limitation would exist in prosecution of offenses
for which the death penalty is a punishment prescribed by or pursuant to the UCMJ,” the Senate Report to the 1986 amendment affirms that Congress intended Article 43 to be applied based on the UCMJ’s
text. S. Rep. No. 331, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 249 (1986)
(emphasis added). That is also consistent with the understanding of courts—then and now—that whether
an offense was “punishable by death” turned on the
statutorily authorized punishment, not the constitutionally permissible one. See Coon v. United States,
411 F.2d 422, 425 (8th Cir. 1969) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3281); see also United States v. Kennedy, 618 F.2d
557, 557–58 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (“punishable
by death” analysis turns on “existing statutory language” not on this Court’s constitutional interpretation) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (1976)).
In 2006, Congress further amended Article 43 to
make clear that both rape and rape of a child may
be prosecuted without limitation. See 2006 NDAA
§§ 552(e)–(f), 553(a), 119 Stat. at 3263–64, codified at
10 U.S.C. § 843(a) (2006 & Supp. I 2007). Those amendments followed a 2005 Department of Defense report
that recommended adding “rape and rape of a child”
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to Article 43 to “clarif[y]” that Willenbring “is still
good law and that there is an unlimited statute of limitations for all offenses that list death as a statutorily
potential sentence—even if death is not a Constitutionally permitted punishment.” Dep’t of Defense, Sex
Crimes and the UCMJ: A Report for the Joint Service
Committee on Military Justice 285 (2005) (“Notwithstanding, the Coker prohibition against the death penalty for rape, the military statute of limitations for rape
of an adult female should continue to be unlimited.”).7
Congress was clear that the purpose of the amendment was not to alter the statute of limitations for
rape in the military, but to “clarify that rape is also an
offense with an unlimited statute of limitations.” H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 360, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. 703 (2005)
(emphasis added). In contrast, that same Conference
Report stated that Congress was “extend[ing] the statute of limitations for certain child abuse offenses.”
Ibid. (emphasis added); see also H.R. Rep. No. 89,
109th Cong., 1st Sess. 332 (2005) (same).
Subsequent legislative history bears out this reading. In 2013, Congress again amended the UCMJ to
provide—for the first time—that sexual assault in the
military could be prosecuted without limitation. See
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2014 § 1703(a), Pub. L. No. 113-66, 127 Stat. 671, 958
(2013), codified at 10 U.S.C. § 843(a) (2012 & Supp. II
2014) (“Elimination of five-year statute of limitations
on trial by court-martial for additional offenses involving sex-related crimes”) (capitalization altered). The
Joint Explanatory Statement directly explained that
7

https://jpp.whs.mil/public/docs/03_Topic-Areas/02-Article_120
/20150116/58_Report_SexCrimes_UCMJ.pdf.
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Congress was “eliminat[ing] the 5-year statute of limitations * * * for sexual assault.” Joint Explanatory
Statement, 159 Cong. Rec. H7984, at H7949 (2013)
(emphasis added). Congress’ use of “eliminate” further confirms that although Congress changed the
limitations period applicable to sexual assault in
2013, it merely clarified that rape in the military was
subject to prosecution without limitation in 2006.
The text, structure, and history of the UCMJ thus
speak with one voice: No temporal limitation applies
to the prosecution of respondents’ rapes. The court of
appeals’ judgment to the contrary cannot stand.
II. CONGRESS REMOVED ANY LIMITATIONS ON
PROSECUTING RAPE IN THE MILITARY TO
ACHIEVE CRITICAL POLICY GOALS.
Congress’ decision to impose severe penalties for
rape in the military rests on its judgment that this
crime—while always abhorrent—is uniquely pernicious in the military environment for at least two critical reasons. First, rape not only harms service members as individuals but also undermines the
discipline, morale, and good order of the military as a
whole. And second, the military context presents special difficulties that contribute to persistent underreporting that impedes the prosecution of rape.
A. Congress Sought To Address The
Unique Harms Associated With Rape
In The Military.
Since 1986, prosecution of rape in the military has
not been subject to any temporal limitations—embodying Congress’ long-standing judgment that rape in
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the military is uniquely harmful and must be met
with the severest of penalties.8
In addition to its “devastating impact on victims,”
rape in the military “negatively affect[s] morale, good
order and discipline and the unit cohesion and combat
effectiveness of military personnel and units.” Dep’t
of Defense, Sex Crimes and the UCMJ at 2–3; see also
Gov’t Br. 5–6, 34–35. Rape is “one of the most destructive factors in building a mission-focused military.”
Memorandum from James N. Mattis, Sec’y of Defense,
to All Members of Dep’t of Defense: Sexual Assault
Prevention and Awareness (Apr. 18, 2018).9 Then-Secretary Mattis explained that “[u]nit cohesion is what
holds us together under stress and keeps us combat
effective when the chips are down.” Ibid. Sexual violence poses an existential threat to the cohesion on
which military readiness and effectiveness depend.10
8

That rape in the military has been punishable by death
“since at least 1863” reflects the seriousness with which Congress has approached this heinous crime. Kennedy, 554 U.S. at
946 (statement of Kennedy, J., respecting the denial of rehearing); see also note 2.
9

https://dod.defense.gov/portals/1/features/2018/0418_sapr
/saap-osd004331-18-res.pdf.
10

About 20,500 “penetrative or contact sexual assault[s]” were
reported across the Armed Forces in 2018, a 38 percent increase
from 2016. Dep’t of Defense, Annual Report on Sexual Assault
in the Military: Fiscal Year 2018 10 (Apr. 2019), https://www.sapr
.mil/sites/default/files/DoD_Annual_Report_on_Sexual_Assault
_in_the_Military.pdf. The Department found that just over 6
percent of servicewomen and just under 1 percent of servicemen
were victims of “sexual assault in the year prior to being surveyed.” Ibid. For women, the rate of sexual assault or rape increased by over 50 percent—to the highest level in over a decade.
Ibid.
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Unlike in the civilian context, where survivors
can generally (though of course not always) try to
avoid future contact with their assailants, there is no
such latitude in the military. A survivor of rape in the
military “deals with the rape and the impact on her
community and also the ongoing influence of the offender on her life outside of that specific assault.”
Dep’t of Defense, Judicial Proceedings Panel, Report
on Retaliation Related to Sexual Assault Offenses 16
(Feb. 2016).11
After all, “[m]ilitary life requires that large numbers of young men and women live and work together
in close quarters that are often highly isolated.” Dep’t
of Defense, Sex Crimes and the UCMJ at 12. As a result, “[t]he deterrence of sexual offenses in such circumstances is critical to military efficiency.” Ibid. As
then-Secretary Mattis put it, “trust [is] the coin of the
realm and our bedrock in building a cohesive team,
one free of denigrating behavior.” Mattis Memorandum. When that trust is broken, the team’s effectiveness suffers as a result.
Above all, of course, is the profound harm rapists
inflict on their victims. The most common effects are
posttraumatic stress disorder, depression, and anxiety. Rape exacerbates the already prevalent problem
of PTSD in the military: about half of all women who
have been sexually assaulted experience PTSD. Kaitlin A. Chivers-Wilson, Sexual Assault and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A Review of the Biological, Psychological and Sociological Factors and Treatments, 9

11

http://jpp.whs.mil/Public/docs/08-Panel_Reports/04_JPP
_Retaliation_Report_Final_20160211.pdf.
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McGill J. Med. 111, 112 (2006).12 Studies show that
“depression occurred three times as often in women
who were the victims of a sexual assault” in the military and that “sexual assault or harassment was more
closely related to anxiety symptoms than combat
stress.” Dep’t of Defense, Sex Crimes and the UCMJ
at 50.
A Veterans Affairs factsheet drives home the devastating and far-reaching effects of sexual assault, including strong emotions; feelings of numbness; trouble sleeping; difficulties with attention, concentration,
and memory; substance abuse; relationship difficulties; and both physical and mental health problems.
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Military Sexual Trauma 1–
2 (May 2015).13 Congress had ample reason to conclude that a crime inflicting this panoply of harms
warrants the most severe punishment and should be
prosecuted without regard to the passage of time.
B. Underreporting Poses A Particular
Challenge To Prosecuting Rape In The
Military.
Sexual assault “remain[s] chronically underreported when compared to reporting rates for other
forms of violent crime.” Dep’t of Defense, Report of the
Response Systems to Adult Sexual Assault Crimes
12

The process of post-rape care and investigation can itself trigger PTSD symptoms, referred to as “secondary victimization.” Rebecca Campbell & Sheela Raja, The Sexual Assault and Secondary
Victimization of Female Veterans: Help-Seeking Experiences with
Military and Civilian Social Systems, 29 Psychology of Women Q.
97, 97–106 (2005). A truncated limitations period can amplify the
false message that the victim’s trauma is not worth investigating.
13

https://www.mentalhealth.va.gov/docs/mst_general_factsheet
.pdf.
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Panel 8 (June 2014).14 Survivors are often reluctant
to come forward given “society’s tendency to blame
[them] for the crime” and because they “struggle[ ]
with shame and self-blame; feelings of confusion,
helplessness, and lack of control; and the fear of the
consequences of reporting.” Id. at 59. Tragically, last
year nearly 70 percent of sexual assault victims in the
military did not report the crime. Dep’t of Defense,
Annual Report Fiscal Year 2018 at 4, 10.
For survivors of rape in the military, the problem
is even worse—they “face unique barriers to reporting
that do not exist in the civilian world.” Dep’t of Defense, Response Systems at 60. Chief among these is
the “hierarchical structure” that “focus[es] on obedience, order, and mission before self” that rests at the
heart of military service. Ibid. Enlisted members “are
taught blind obedience to every order” and are trained
“to subordinate themselves in service of the larger
goals and needs of the unit.” Id. at 62.
While this structure may be crucial to military
success, it frequently exacerbates the chronic problem
of underreporting. Id. at 60. Where a perpetrator is
a ranking superior, the survivor may be particularly
wary of reporting as doing so may seem to go against
the grain of “obedience” and “subordination”—in addition to concerns that “others will ignore or tend to disbelieve their allegations.” Id. at 60–62. The problem
is endemic. Among women who reported penetrative
sexual assault, nearly 60 percent were assaulted by
someone with a higher rank, and nearly 25 percent
were assaulted by someone in their chain of command.
14

http://responsesystemspanel.whs.mil/Public/docs/Reports/00
_Final/RSP_Report_Final_20140627.pdf.
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Dep’t of Defense, Office of People Analytics, 2018
Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of Active
Duty Members 34 (May 2019).15
Moreover, given the close proximity in which service members typically live and work, “sexual assault
allegation[s] involving members of the same military
unit may divide loyalties among a close-knit group of
people who should be working toward a common goal.”
Dep’t of Defense, Response Systems at 60. Rather
than risk the unity and cohesion of the unit, survivors
of rape in the military often forego reporting in a
tragic effort to place the unit’s well-being above their
own. See id. at 62 (“As one sexual assault victim told
the Panel: * * * ‘I felt that reporting [the sexual assault] would distract my unit and distract me from
th[e] mission that I was given.’ ”).
These considerations heighten the fear of reprisal
that rape survivors often experience outside the military context: “The effects of retaliation on a victim can
be particularly acute in the military environment because the accused and the victim often share the same
community, the same peers, and the same mission.”
Dep’t of Defense, Report on Retaliation at 16. These
concerns are not unfounded. A 2014 survey by the
RAND Corporation indicated that 62 percent of
women on active military duty who reported unwanted sexual contact experienced some form of retaliation. Id. at 3, 11.
Similarly, the Department of Defense’s 2012 Workplace and Gender Relations Survey revealed that 47
percent of women who did not report unwanted sexual
15

https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/files/Annex_1_2018_WGRA
_Overview_Report.pdf.
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contact were afraid of retaliation or thought they
would be labeled as a troublemaker. Dep’t of Defense,
Response Systems at 60. Just as troubling, 43 percent
of these women did not report unwanted sexual contact in light of the negative experience of other survivors who did come forward, and 28 percent were concerned that reporting would negatively affect their
performance evaluation or chance for promotion. Id.
at 60–61. This fear of retaliation works to “erode
trust” in military organizations, “violates fundamental military values,” and “undermines a commander’s
ability to maintain good order and discipline.” Dep’t
of Defense, Report on Retaliation at 17. And it perpetuates an endless “cycle of sexual assault” and underreporting. Id. at 3.
That outcome is precisely what Congress has long
been committed to addressing by insisting that perpetrators of sexual violence in the military must face justice, no matter how long ago they committed their
crimes, and no matter how great the pressure on survivors to remain silent. Then and now, no statute of
limitations prevents the prosecution of rape in the
military—an offense so severe that Congress has determined it warrants the severest punishment.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted.
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